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I. Introduction
It is a wonder that Los Angeles County Flood Control District v. Natural
Resources Defense Council 1 found its way to the Supreme Court. Despite some
inconsistencies in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, specifically in its application
of South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 2 all parties
were surprised when the Court granted certiorari on the Miccosukee question
alone. Even before oral argument, Los Angeles County was dubbed, “A Clean
Water Act question no one cares to debate.” 3

* J.D. Candidate, May 2015, University of Michigan Law School. I owe many thanks to
Brian Flynn and the entirety of the West-Northwest Journal of Environmental Law and
Policy’s staff for their superb suggestions. I would also like to thank Professor Sara
Gosman for her guidance, and my friends and family, especially Keren Thoms, for
their unwavering support.
1.

133 S. Ct. 710 (2013).

2. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 103–05
(2004).
3. Kevin Russell, Argument Preview: A Clean Water Act Question No One Cares to
Debate, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 3, 2012, 2:32 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/12/
argument-preview-a-clean-water-act-question-no-one-cares-to-debate/.
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This casual treatment, however, belies the actual significance of this
case. Beneath the Miccosukee issue 4 was a broader question regarding
liability under the Clean Water Act (“CWA”). In the lower courts, the Natural
Resources Defense Council (“NRDC” or Respondent) argued that the Los
Angeles County Flood Control District’s (the “District” or Petitioner)
monitoring results proved, as a matter of law, that the District was liable
under its permit. The District argued that, although the monitoring results
proved that pollutants had exceeded the permissible levels of the permit,
the results did not establish who was responsible for the excess pollution
and, therefore, the District could not be held liable. In short, the parties
were arguing over the significance and enforceability of National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permits, which are the backbone of
the CWA.
The Supreme Court was not interested in the significance and
enforceability of NPDES permits. Instead, the Court chose to hear the
Miccosukee issue, a question on which all parties—petitioner, respondent,
and the United States, as amicus curiae—agreed.
Following this surprise, the District and NRDC were challenged to
figure out a strategy that addressed the narrow question asked by the
Supreme Court, yet still win on the liability issue that the Court declined to
hear. For the District, the goal was to extend the Court’s inevitably favorable
ruling on the Miccosukee issue to include a finding of no liability. Remand
was undesirable for the District. They did not want to give NRDC another
opportunity to retell the confusing facts of the case, which were fairly
damaging to the District. NRDC’s goal was to direct the Supreme Court
towards a narrow decision: either affirm the Ninth Circuit’s favorable
judgment or remand the liability question back to the Ninth Circuit, where
they would have a favorable, though confused, panel of judges.
Both parties took their cue from the struggle the lower courts exhibited
and centered their strategies on presenting the facts. The District attempted
to capitalize on the complexities, while NRDC went to great lengths to
simplify. On the surface, the case involved a question of law (i.e.,
interpreting Miccosukee), but the true battle was helping the justices
understand the complex facts and science of the case.
In this way, Los Angeles County is a perfect example of a difficulty that
underlies many environmental cases. Environmental facts are often
incredibly complex and based on science that even the Ph.Ds among us
struggle to comprehend. And if this were not enough, these facts are
siphoned through environmental laws that are no walk in the park
themselves.

4. The question in Miccosukee involved whether a “discharge of pollutants”
occurs when polluted water flows from one portion of a river into another. Miccosukee,
541 U.S. at 105.
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Environmental laws are rife with jargon and compound terms (e.g.,
acronyms such as NAAQS and NPDES). 5 Judges, who often have little
scientific background and struggle with such terminology, have described
these laws as a “symphony of acronyms,” 6 an “alphabet soup,” 7 and “a feast
of officialese.” 8 The Ninth Circuit appropriately captured this complexity
when it wrote, “this case involves the FWPCA, that is, the CWA, and
particularly ICSs, issued pursuant to WQSs, which may affect the NPDES
permits issued to WTPs.” 9
While this judicial comment can be taken tongue in cheek, there is a
greater message, which advocates would be wise to remember:
environmental law is a difficult field for judges. As a clearly frustrated D.C.
Circuit once reminded the litigants in an environmental case, “The first rule
of advocacy is to make your argument understandable.” 10
It is easy for litigants to forget this obvious rule when they have
internalized the issues after spending months, if not years, on the case.
They have steeped in the intricacies of the facts and the law, and are likely
specialists in the environmental field. In contrast, judges, who are charged
with deciding numerous cases touching on a wide variety of legal issues as
quickly as possible, are not similarly situated.
In Los Angeles County, the Ninth Circuit reminded NRDC of this disparity
when its decision misapplied the law because the court misunderstood the
facts. While the favorable judgment pleased NRDC, it was a muted victory
that highlighted the challenges environmental law advocates face.
The Ninth Circuit even admitted that it did not fully understand the
facts: “Plaintiffs have not endeavored to provide the Court with a map or
cogent explanation of the interworkings or connections of this complicated
drainage system.” 11 NRDC took this comment seriously and repackaged its
presentation of the facts to the Supreme Court, as well as on remand in the
Ninth Circuit. On the other side, the District attempted to capitalize on the
convoluted facts that the Ninth Circuit misunderstood.
The battle fought in the Supreme Court should never have occurred
because the facts of the case were never in dispute and the parties agreed

5. See Richard Lazarus, Complex Laws Can’t Spell Judicial Respect, ENVTL. F., Jan.Feb. 2005, at 8.
6.

N. Shore Gas Co. v. EPA, 930 F.2d 1239, 1242 (7th Cir. 1991).

7.

McEvoy v. IEI Barge Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 671, 674 (7th Cir. 2010).

8.

Simmons v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs., 120 F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 1997).

9.

Sierra Club v. EPA, 995 F.2d 1478, 1480 n.1 (9th Cir. 1993).

10.

Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 115 F.3d 979, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

11. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 673 F.3d 880, 901
(9th Cir. 2011), rev’d sub nom., Los Angeles Cnty. Flood Control Dist. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 710 (2013).
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on the answer to the Miccosukee question. However, the case serves as a
reminder to environmental advocates that the fact section is a critical first
hurdle to achieving a favorable judgment.

II. Background Facts
Los Angeles County originally centered on liability for violating the
NPDES permit of the municipal separate storm sewer system (“MS4”). An
MS4 is a publicly owned collection of storm drains, pipes, outfalls, and other
infrastructure that collects stormwater runoff and discharges it into
navigable waters without treatment. 12 The MS4 operated by the District
contained “thousands of discharge points, known as outfalls.” 13 These
outfalls discharge pollutants collected in stormwater (e.g., fecal bacteria,
aluminum, mercury, and lead) into rivers that ultimately empty into the
Pacific Ocean. 14
Under the CWA, MS4s are “point sources” 15 and require the operator
(in this case the District) to obtain an NPDES permit. 16 Any noncompliance
with the terms of the NPDES permit is a violation of the CWA. 17 The parties
in this case agreed: (1) the District’s MS4s were point sources and (2) the
MS4s did not discharge pollutants, as defined in the CWA, 18 into the rivers. 19
Rather, the argument in the lower courts was over the precise amount of,
and liability for, pollutant levels at the outfalls.
The CAA allows municipalities to receive MS4 discharge permits on a
system- or jurisdiction-wide basis when a number of entities operate in an
interconnected sewer system. 20 This allows for a more efficient allocation of

12.

40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(8) (2012).

13. Brief for Respondents at 4, Los Angeles Cnty., 133 S. Ct. 710 (2013) (No. 11460), 2012 WL 5388769, at *4.
14. Id.; see also 64 Fed. Reg. 68,722, 68,725 (Dec. 8, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R.
pts. 9, 122, 123, 124).
15. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2012) (defining “point source” as “any discernible,
confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch,
channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated
animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are
or may be discharged”).
16.

33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(a), (k); 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(a).

17.

33 U.S.C. § 1342(k).

18. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (defining “discharge of pollutants,” in relevant part, as
“any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source”).
19.

Los Angeles Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 712–13; Brief for Respondents, supra note 13,

20.

33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(p)(2)(c), (p)(3)(b)(i).

at 4.

56

West

Northwest, Vol. 21, No. 1, Winter 2015

permits, as only one permit is needed for an interconnected MS4, rather
than a permit for each municipality. 21 Considering that the District received
its NPDES permit only after 80,000 pages of administrative records,
testimony of twenty-nine witnesses, and over fifty public meetings, 22 it is
clear that approving a permit is a complicated, time-consuming process.
The District, the County of Los Angeles, and the eighty-four connected
municipalities received a jurisdiction-wide permit. 23 However, the District
operated more MS4s than all the other municipalities combined. 24
Monitoring stations are distinct from the MS4s. In order to obtain a
MS4 permit, a discharger must prove that it will monitor for compliance with
the permit conditions. 25 The monitoring must be of a “representative”
sample of the discharges being regulated. 26 This monitoring may be done at
“instream stations,” instead of at the MS4 outfalls. 27 In this case, the
monitoring occurred at instream stations, where the river had been modified
with a concrete channel for flood control reasons. 28

III. Ninth Circuit Decision
The Ninth Circuit confused where the MS4 and the instream
monitoring stations were located in relation to each other. 29 In reality, the
MS4 discharge points were located upstream of the monitoring stations,
which allowed them to sample pollutants discharged from the upstream
MS4s. However, the Ninth Circuit believed that the MS4s discharge points
were located downstream of the monitoring stations.
The Ninth Circuit’s misunderstanding of the facts undoubtedly affected
the outcome of the case. The court’s confusion is plainly evidenced in its
opinion: “[W]hen the pollutants were detected, they had not yet exited the
point source [i.e., the MS4] into navigable water. . . . [T]here is no dispute

21. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 673 F.3d 880, 894
(9th Cir. 2011) (“Congress put the NPDES permitting requirement at the municipal
level to ease the burden of administering the program.”). For example, the systemwide MS4 permit in question otherwise would have required eighty-six separate
permits. See Brief of Petitioner at 10, Los Angeles Cnty., 133 S. Ct. 710 (No. 11–460),
2012 WL 3945845, at *10.
22.

Brief for Respondents, supra note 13, at 46–47.

23.

Natural Res. Def. Council, 673 F.3d at 886.

24.

Brief for Respondents, supra note 13, at 54.

25.

33 U.S.C. § 1311(h)(3).

26.

Id.

27.

See 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(d)(2)(iii)(D).

28.

Los Angeles Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 712.

29.

See Brief for Respondents, supra note 13, at 30.
57
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that [the] MS4 eventually adds stormwater to [the rivers] . . . downstream
from the Monitoring Stations.” 30 In actuality, the pollutants were detected at
the monitoring stations after they exited the MS4. Possibly compelled to
hold the District responsible for the exceedances to which it at least partially
contributed, the Ninth Circuit found the District liable for the discharges. 31
If the locations of the monitoring stations were the only confusion, the
Supreme Court most likely would not have granted certiorari. However,
there has to be a “discharge” from a “point source” in order to find liability
under the CWA. In holding that the District was liable for the exceedances,
it reasoned that “[t]he discharge from a point source occurred when the stillpolluted stormwater flowed out of the concrete channels where the
Monitoring Stations are located . . . and into the navigable waterways.”32
This strained attempt to apply the misunderstood facts within the CWA’s
framework led to a direct tension with Miccosukee, in which the Supreme
Court held that merely transferring water from one portion of a water body
into another does not constitute a discharge. 33

IV. Advocacy Strategy
A. The District’s Strategy
As all parties agreed, it was a foregone conclusion that the Supreme
Court would find that the Ninth Circuit misapplied Miccosukee. Even though
neither side truly cared about this issue, a favorable ruling for the District
would cast doubt on the Ninth Circuit’s entire decision, which had assigned
liability for the discharges to the District. As such, the District’s underlying
strategy was to bootstrap its liability argument to the inevitable favorable
decision on the Miccosukee question.
The District’s strategy was not an easy task because the actual facts of
the case did not implicate Miccosukee. The question of whether the MS4
contributed to the discharge of a pollutant became relevant only because
the Ninth Circuit believed that the MS4s were downstream of the monitoring
stations. Rather than clarifying this discrepancy, the District attempted to
capitalize on it.
The District did not devote a single word in its briefs to explain that
the Ninth Circuit misunderstood the facts. In fact, it repeatedly relied on the
Ninth Circuit’s mischaracterization of the facts to argue that the court

30. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 673 F.3d 880, 899–
900 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added).
31.

See Id. (“[T]he precise location of each outfall is ultimately irrelevant . . . .”).

32.

Id.

33.
(2004).
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misapplied the law. 34 By adopting the Ninth Circuit’s version of the facts,
the District implied that the court got the facts correct. The District
continued this strategy at oral argument, repeatedly applying the Ninth
Circuit’s mistaken logic that the discharge took place at the monitoring site
and not at the MS4. 35
The District tried not only to confuse the facts but also to convolute
the issue in the case. For example, in “Section D” of its brief, the District
transitioned from the Miccosukee issue into the liability question mid-section.
The section started a straight-forward Miccosukee argument: nothing in the
legislative history of the CWA suggested that transferring water within the
same water body constitutes an “addition” or “discharge.” 36 Two paragraphs
later, the argument pivoted to the liability issue, under the camouflage of
congressional intent: “more fundamentally, in enacting the CWA, Congress
generally intended that pollutants be controlled at the source whenever
possible . . . . [I]mposition of liability on the entity maintaining the channel,
does nothing to address the actual source of pollutants.” 37 However the
congressional intent referenced by the District was the general intent behind
the entirety of the CWA, not the MS4 program specifically. At this point in its
brief, the District abandoned its Miccosukee argument, spoke solely about
liability, and rehashed its arguments from the lower courts.
Environmental cases are especially suitable for combining issues in
such a manner. The complexity of the issues obscures the extent of the
statutory text. 38 As such, the District went to great lengths to remind the
Court that the issues were confusing. 39 In light of such complexity, the Court
welcomed an easily digestible argument about congressional intent. While
not all justices are eager to rely on congressional intent to understand a
complex statute, such an argument was at least familiar to the Court. As the
Supreme Court said in another Clean Water Act case, “[f]aced with such a

34. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 21, at 39 (“There is simply no support for the
Ninth Circuit’s statement that there may be a discharge from a point source under
the CWA based solely on the fact that water has flowed from an improved ‘manmade’ portion of a river into a purportedly ‘natural occurring’ portion of the same
river.”).
35. Transcript of Oral Argument at 12–13, 19, Los Angeles Cnty. Flood Control
Dist. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 710 (2013) (No. 11–460).
36.

Brief of Petitioner, supra note 21, at 45.

37.

Id. at 46–47.

38. See, e.g., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132
(1985) (“In determining the limits of its powers to regulate discharges under the Act,
the Corps must necessarily choose some point at which water ends and land begins.
Our common experience tells us that this is often no easy task . . . .”).
39.

Brief of Petitioner, supra note 21, at 50.
59
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problem of defining the bounds of [an agency’s] regulatory authority,” it is
appropriate to “look to the legislative history and underlying policies of its
statutory grants of authority.” 40
The congressional intent argument essentially unmoored this case
from a science-based factual dispute and brought it within the Court’s
comfort zone. Blending the Miccosukee argument with a liability argument
based on congressional intent, the District painted the case as touching on
liability in the hope that the Court would return an expansive ruling.
Similarly, the District devoted three pages of its opening brief to argue
a broad theme of personal responsibility related to the liability issue. 41 The
District portrayed itself as attempting to comply with a complicated permit
and admitted to the Court that the permit stated, “Each Permittee is
responsible . . . for a discharge for which it is the operator.” 42 Yet, the
monitoring results were simply too imprecise to apportion liability to any
specific permittee. While NRDC could have engaged in more precise
monitoring—as the district court requested 43—to bolster its liability claim,
the District lacked better information and simply could do no more.
The District’s argument struck the conservative “personal
responsibility” chord. 44 More importantly, it depicted NRDC as advocating
that larger entities should be responsible for more than their “fair share,” a
sentiment that has not garnered much sympathy from the Roberts Court. 45
Thus, this Court has shown that it sympathizes with arguments similar to
that of the District.

40.

Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. at 132.

41.

Brief of Petitioner, supra note 21, at 48–50.

42.

Id. at 10.

43.

Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 35, at 18.

44. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (“[The
Second Amendment] surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding,
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.” (emphasis added));
Clarence Thomas, Assoc. J., U.S. Sup. Ct., Personal Responsibility, Speech at Regent
University (Sept. 10, 1996) in 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 317 (2000); John D. Ashcroft, Justice
Clarence Thomas: Reviving Restraint and Personal Responsibility, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 313
(2000).
45. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014)
(holding that requiring corporations to provide contraceptives or pay a fine was a
substantial burden on religious exercise); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132
S. Ct. 2566, 2589–91 (2012) (rejecting the individual mandate of the Affordable Care
Act under the commerce clause); see also EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P. 134
S. Ct. 1584, 1615 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that states should only have
to reduce air pollution in proportion to their emissions).
60
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The true strength of the District’s argument was that it presented a
digestible thematic argument, which the Court could relate to. As such, the
Court had an alternative to mucking around in the complexities. Although
courts are tasked with handling complex cases, policy arguments frame the
issue for the Court and help the justices understand the facts in a particular
light. Such advocacy can be especially effective in environmental cases due
to the complexity of the issues involved.

B. NRDC’s Strategy
NRDC had a lot stacked against it. It was an environmental group
defending a Ninth Circuit decision, which was based on a misreading of the
facts and a misapplication of the law. These substantive weaknesses would
be hard for anyone to overcome. To add insult to injury, the Roberts Court
is well known for a lack of hospitality to environmental groups, especially in
cases on appeal from the Ninth Circuit. 46
NRDC knew it would lose on the Miccosukee issue. However, NRDC
wanted the Court to limit its holding to the Miccosukee issue, thereby leaving
the liability issue untouched. NRDC knew that any Supreme Court ruling on
liability would not be as friendly as one from the Ninth Circuit on remand.
There were two issues that NRDC needed to clarify in order to prevail.
First, that the liability issue was separate from the Miccosukee issue. Second,
NRDC needed to explain the general facts of the case, in order to convince
the Court that the Ninth Circuit misunderstood the facts. With clarified
facts, NRDC hoped that the Court would remand the case, rather than
reverse it.
With these goals in mind, NRDC began its case in a fascinating way.
The opening line of NRDC’s brief read, “Respondents agree with petitioner
and the United States on the answer to the question presented by the
petition: the transfer of water through a concrete channel within a single
river does not constitute a discharge of pollutants from a point source under

46. See, e.g., Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013), rev’g 640 F.3d
1063 (9th Cir. 2011); Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008), rev’g
518 F.3d 658 (9th Cir. 2008); Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009), rev’g
in part 490 F.3d 687 (9th Cir. 2007); Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation
Council, 557 U.S. 261 (2009), rev’g 486 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Stephen M.
Johnson, The Roberts Court and the Environment, 37 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 317 (2010);
Jonathan H. Alder, Business, the Environment, and the Roberts Court: A Preliminary
Assessment, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 943 (2009); Richard Frank, In the Supreme Court’s
Crosshairs: The Ninth Circuit’s Environmental Jurisprudence, LEGALPLANET (June 19, 2012),
http://legal-planet.org/2012/06/19/in-the-supreme-courts-crosshairs-the-ninthcircuits-environmental-jurisprudence.
61
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the Clean Water Act.” 47 In first sentence of the brief, NRDC had conceded
the question presented in the case.
The second sentence was no slouch either: “The answer to the
question petitioner presents, however, has no bearing on petitioner’s
liability and does not resolve this case, because petitioner does not simply
transfer water within a single river.” 48 In two sentences, NRDC separated the
Miccosukee issue from the liability issue, which the District had tried to
combine.
NRDC placed both the Miccosukee issue and the liability issue in the
“Questions Presented” section, even though the Court had granted certiorari
on only one 49 and repeated this refrain throughout its brief. NRDC’s strategy
contrasted with the District’s approach, which included only the Miccosukee
question in their “Questions Presented” section but subtly weaved in the
liability issue. 50
Beyond clarifying that two issues were at play, NRDC emphasized the
fact section. While it still had to slough through the MS4 and NPDES
permitting explanation, NRDC placed these complicated facts in an
understandable framework. NRDC started its statement of the case with the
background on the necessity of MS4 permits: “Stormwater runoff . . . is now
the principal source of water pollution in California. . . . [S]tormwater runoff
harm[s] human health. Illness rates increase significantly among those who
swim at beaches near stormwater discharge points.” 51
Opening the brief in this way, NRDC humanized an otherwise “mindnumbing” 52 topic. As the Court struggled to understand the inner-workings
of the CWA, the MS4, the location of the discharge in relation to the
monitoring stations, and whether the sampling at those stations was
representative of the discharges’ pollution levels, the justices could always
fall back on the easily understandable and persuasive human health
concerns.
Environmental groups often lose the forest for the trees. By focusing
on the intricacies of the “legislative labyrinth” of environmental law, 53
advocates fail to emphasize what is truly important about the topic. Federal
environmental laws were created in response to rivers on fire and silent

47.

Brief for Respondents, supra note 13, at 1.

48.

Id.

49.

Id. at i.

50.

Brief of Petitioner, supra note 21, at i.

51.

Brief for Respondents, supra note 13, at 3 (citation omitted).

52. Cf. Am. Mining Congress v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(describing an explanation of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act as “mindnumbing”).
53.
62

See Citizens Coal Council v. EPA, 385 F.3d 969, 972 (6th Cir. 2004).
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springs, not delivered from on high. By forgetting to put the facts in a
context with which all sides can sympathize, environmental advocates lose
their case amidst tortured explanations of complicated and unsettled
science.
As the Ninth Circuit’s decision reminded NRDC, advocates should
always remember their audience. Beyond explaining the adverse human
health and environmental effects of the pollution, NRDC explained to the
Court that the associated high illness rates and beach closures cost the
region “tens of millions of dollars.” 54 Courts are better able to understand
such real life implications of a proble, rather than the underlying science.
Simultaneously, NRDC’s focus on the larger themes of environmental
law undermined the District’s “congressional intent” reasoning. To the
degree that congressional intent can be gleaned from the ambiguous
sections of environmental statutes, Congress’ intent was more likely to
protect the environment than to create loopholes for polluters to escape
liability.
As NRDC pointed out, when Congress intends to create
exemptions, it does so explicitly. 55
NRDC also heeded the Ninth Circuit’s frustration and attached maps
of the relevant MS4s to its brief in order to further clarify the facts. 56 These
maps illustrated exactly where the MS4s were located in relation to the
monitoring stations. The maps also showed that the MS4, which is literally
thousands of miles long, was not a part of the rivers in question. By clearly
illustrating that the discharges were coming from outside the rivers, NRDC
was able to highlight that Miccosukee was not the answer to this case,
Clarification of the facts, with which it was unsuccessful in the lower
courts, guided NRDC’s substantive arguments. Even if NRDC’s explanation
of the facts to the lower courts was satisfactory, advocates should remember
that sometimes, clear explanations of complex systems are not available.
NRDC remembered the “first rule of advocacy” 57 and made its arguments
understandable: first, by severing the two questions that the petitioner
blended into one, attaching maps to its brief, and, second, by framing the
case within the larger theme of human and economic health.

54.

Brief for Respondents, supra note 13, at 3.

55.

Id. at 40.

56.

Id. at 17a, 18a.

57.

See supra text accompanying note 9.
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V. The Supreme Court’s Decision
As one commentator noted, “The Court unanimously agrees with
everyone else.” 58 In an opinion that barely reached five pages, the
unanimous Court held “that the parties correctly answered the sole question
presented. . . . [T]he flow of water from an improved portion of a navigable
waterway into an unimproved portion of the very same waterway does not
qualify as a discharge of pollutants under the CWA.” 59 In short, the Court
reiterated the Miccosukee holding.
More importantly, the Supreme Court, refusing to go into the liability
issue, stated that “[i]t is not embraced within, or even touched by, the
narrow question on which we granted certiorari. We therefore do not
address, and indicate no opinion on, the issue the NRDC . . . seek[s] to
substitute for the question we took up for review.” 60
While the Court’s comment seems like an admonishment of NRDC for
expressly arguing the liability question, it is also a recognition that NRDC’s
strategy won the day. NRDC successfully severed the two arguments,
showing the Court that it did not need to reach further than a simple
restatement of Miccosukee. NRDC’s intense focus on the facts and inclusion
of maps in its brief proved to be a strong strategy that helped the Court
recognize that the Ninth Circuit got the facts wrong. 61

VI. Lessons Learned
An old adage, which is perhaps most accurate for environmental law,
states that many more cases are lost than won. Spending fifty pages parsing
the minutiae of applying difficult law to complex science is not an effective
strategy. Rather, shifting the focus—from the complex, small details to the
comprehensible, big picture—is a strategy that will hold a court’s attention
and may even win its favor.
Lawyers and judges do not enter the field of law to engage in technical
discussions over statutory construction. Many would rather answer the
larger theoretical questions that form the foundation of the legal profession,
such as the role that laws and government should play in society.
Environmental law, which asks society to balance its interests in human and

58. Kevin Russell, Opinion Analysis: The Court Unanimously Agrees with Everyone Else,
SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 10, 2013, 10:14 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/01/opinionanalysis-the-court-unanimously-agrees-with-everyone-else/.
59. Los Angeles Cnty. Flood Dist. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
710, 712–13 (2013).
60.

Id. at 714.

61. See id at 713 n.1 (“Whatever the source of the Court of Appeals’ error, all
parties agree that the court’s analysis was erroneous.”).
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environmental health against encouraging development and the free market,
is at the forefront of such questions.
Environmental advocates would be wise to anchor their complex facts
in the underlying purpose of the law. It is just as important to point out the
ten percent increase in asthma rates nationwide in the past decade 62 as it is
to argue how the term “modification” should be understood in the context of
regulating polluting facilities under the Clean Air Act. 63 In truth, society only
cares about the latter issue because of the former. Advocates should not
forget what animates our laws and what gives them meaning.
Similarly, advocates should remember that judges are not scientists.
They do not have a firm handle on whether certain types of wetlands will
impact navigable waters. Leaving their decision solely to statutory
construction is a disservice to the argument, to the judge, to the
environment, and to the law itself.
NRDC’s advocacy before the Supreme Court in Los Angeles County is a
great example of an environmental group breathing life into an otherwise
“mind-numbing” topic. Strategies such as including maps and figures in an
appendix should be utilized more often. In the context of environmental law
cases, the best way to win a complex argument is to make it simple.

62. JEANNE E. MOORMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. NATIONAL
SURVEILLANCE
OF
ASTHMA:
UNITED
STATES,
2001–2010,
at 23 (2012), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_03/sr03_035.pdf.
63.

See Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561 (2007).
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